What's wrong, England?

England's journey from conquering the ODI World Cup at home to crashing out in the league stage of the next edition—and the 2025 Champions Trophy for good measure—is a bit funny. First up: the batting

I hadn’t really planned to write about this, as I had predicted England would only narrowly miss out on a Champions Trophy semi-final spot, with Afghanistan and South Africa making the cut. But we don’t live in an ideal world. A 0-3 result in the league stage made me wonder whether deeper systemic issues have knocked them off the path that led to their 2019 World Cup triumph and the white-ball revolution that preceded it.

In this piece, I will focus exclusively on how England's batting has evolved across two distinct phases of the format. While changes in their bowling setup, structure, and personnel have played an equally—if not more—significant role in the overall turmoil, I will address those aspects in a follow-up article. That sequel will delve into the key factors that, for lack of a better phrase, seemingly derailed England in ODIs.

A lot of what this article will comprise is the way England’s batting tactics, mannerisms, and just the way they’ve approached it has changed between the years 2015-19 and 2020-now. The data comprises ball-by-ball record for all ODIs starting 1st January 2015 till before the 2025 Champions Trophy, including only games played between full-member nations.

Let’s first look at overs 1-10.

(Side note: Won’t be talking about the final 10 overs between the two phases in conversation here, simply because I believe structural inefficiencies in a batting line-up in England’s case don’t quite trickle down to batters batting 7/8-11. Deltas of advantage gained or lost occur during the first 40 overs. They’re all able to take the team over the line in a uniform manner given the state they’re in after the first 40)

Between 2015 and 2019, England reigned supreme when it came to dominating the first batting powerplay. They struck the quickest and had the third best batting average in that period in the 5 years. The opening pair of Jason Roy and Jonny Bairstow did a little too well setting up the bar for what opening the batting can be in that phase.

Come the next phase, and England found them with a wee bit (okay, maybe more than just a wee bit) of trouble in dealing with the new ball in ODIs. They continued to strike briskly in that period, but their batting average has gone way down, ranking 7th among all full-member nations. It’s interesting to see that while they definitely were a step ahead of their contemporaries between 2015 and 2019 in terms of striking abilities, they simply maintained the course in the subsequent 5 years while the other teams did a great job catching up to them (Australia and India) while maintaining a better wicket retention ability.

I’d rather not use the term ‘bazball’ at all in this piece. I fully understand its significance in the context of Test cricket, and with the rise of the World Test Championship, teams would have naturally adopted that style of play. However, applying that definition to the ODI format is misguided. The brand of aggressive cricket often linked to bazball has long been ingrained in ODIs, well before McCullum took charge. To me, the term has now come to represent reckless aggression—something that has become even more evident given the way England has structured its bowling attack in recent years. But more on that in the sequel.

So, Bazball (bleh). Aggression. Playing high-risk high-reward cricket. Taking the ball head-on from the get-go. Toss early movement out the window. Yada yada. It’s true, England did play more aggressively, but,,, not as much. And definitely not enough, and not well enough to warrant the consequences. In the period 2015-19, England attempted 6.5% aggressive shots in the first 10 overs and lost a wicket to an aggressive shot every 50 odd balls. They upped the ante between 2020-25, hitting 8.1% of all balls faced in that period. However, their balls-per-dismissal faced a steep drop, hitting 32.5. They simply weren’t hitting the ball well enough.

Between overs 1-10

Charted above is their year-on-year prowess of English batters with aggressive shots from 2015 to 2025. The dotted line ensues the region of comparison for our study today, and it is quite befitting. It’s very easy to see how English batters approached the first 10 overs between 2015 and 2019, and how much it different thereon out. We see a near consistent scoring rate for aggressive shots from 2015 and 2019 with the batters maturing steadily in terms of protecting their wicket, and truly coming in their own starting from 2018 (for a point of reference, the first time Roy and Bairstow opened in ODIs was in March, 2017). By 2019, England had gotten pretty good at scoring well with their aggressive shots while not being too callous with their wickets.

Onto the second half of the graphs, that just speaks pure chaos. The team faced horrific returns with aggressive cricket in 2022 (CricViz’s Rufus Bullough did a great study on it back then, do check it out). But their strategy has felt really haphazard through it all. They’re trying to be more aggressive, but it has come at the cost of wickets, and as well as know it has not been an equitable trade-off, with runs/wicket falling to its lowest in 2025 till before the Champions Trophy (don’t expect the numbers to get any rosier when the refreshed data is plugged into it).

I also charted down the aggressive shots across overs in the opening powerplay for England between 2015-19 and 2020-25 to assess if there’s a difference in the way they pace their innings with aggressive shots, and surprise surprise, there is.

Looking at the 2015-19 graph. It shows a steadier, healthier approach to aggression by the England bats. It exhibits that they have had the drive to play a bolder ‘brand’ of cricket then too, but it was of the back of a calculated approach. The % of aggressive shots progress steadily in the first 10 overs in that phase. The numbers for 2020-25, in contrast to this, just make me feel like their approach to aggression has just been…a bit impatient. They want to get going a lot sooner, hitting their peak for % of aggressive shots in the 7th over, then dropping till the end of the powerplay. Now I don’t have it jotted down, but who’s willing to wager that that’s been on the account of losing early wickets.

On to the middle overs now

Plotted above are England’s % of aggressive shots attempted corollary, the SR off of non-boundary balls. For a typical ODI setup its reasonable to assume that more often than not, these should be inversely related. If you’re having a go at fewer balls, you oughta use the remaining to rotate the strike. The same is largely observable from the graph above. Between 2015 and 2019, England traded off their non-boundary ball strike rate for a more proactive approach to hitting in the middle overs so as to not let the innings bog down and both those metrics have continued to tread their expected path as times have move forward. They’re attempted to hit more balls and have curbed the flow of singles and double (and the occasional triple). Nothing much to gain from this except a look in their behaviour and approach towards middle overs. Moving on.

The middle-phase of an innings is when we most predominantly see spin bowling, so its important to see what’s changed there. England has now been defending more balls off of spinners (22%) in the middle overs than they did in the years between 2015-19 (17%). This, however, has been accompanied by a spike in other run-scoring shots played by them, but that has come at the cost of quicker and cheaper wickets.

Across the board, England’s being more aggressive with high-scoring shots against spin. More cuts, more flicks, more drives, but unfortunately, more wickets too. Where they would have attempted the cover drive 12% of the time against spinners between overs 11-40 in 2015-19, they have been attempting it once every 5 balls on average. However, their corresponding batting average against spin for that shot has taken a hit, and a massive one at that, dropping from 127 to 50 in that phase. In terms of numbers, that’s (*takes out calculator*), a lot…

This decline also stems from opponents recognizing and exploiting key matchups. Between 2015 and 2019, 65% of all deliveries in the middle overs were faced by right-handed batters, with left-handers playing the remaining 35%. In the 5 years following that, the proportion moved to 64% RHB and 36% LHB. However, relevant to this, below is the split of spinners bowled to England in these two phases.

The proportion of right-handed batters to left-handed batters in the England ODI setup has more or less stayed the same all this while, but oppositions have been more wary of going with options more suitable to them, distributing bowling styles more variedly against England. Between 2015-19, almost 40% of all spin deliveries bowled at England between overs 11 and 40 came off the hands of off-break bowlers. That number came down to 28.2% in the years 2020-25. Slow-left-arm spinners bowled 35.4% between 2020 and 2025 as opposed to 29.8% in the 5 years preceding that. In the same phase, left-arm wrist spinners now bowl almost 11% of all spin deliveries where they bowled only 4% between 2015-19.

So, by and large, England’s gotten worse, and the opposition has gotten better.

Jotted above are the median fall of wickets in terms of overs. The raw data behind this comprises only the games where all 10 wickets fell for England to ensure an unbiased comparison. To help with readability, the first wicket would fall after 11 overs between 2015-19, where it now falls after ~8 overs, and so on and so forth. This graph, in all its simplicity, gives an honest picture of England’s batting unit’s hurt. They’ve maintained, and even improved scoring rates, but they have been losing wickets sooner, they aren’t able to take the innings. I have always maintained that the entry point of a middle and lower-middle order batter is crucial for their respective outputs. If your number 7 batter comes out to bat in the 36th over, and he is a Liam Livingstone (in my book he’s truly one of a kind), there’s only so much you can get out of him.

Now, a bit on how I personally view this situation. It…sucks. I started following English cricket seriously (like, seriously-seriously) in 2018 I guess (the NZ series probably), and I’ve been a huge fan of, almost, everyone in the setup since then. Loved Roy, loved Bairstow, always loved Root, Stokes was a madman, Buttler was magic, Moeen had…a lovely beard, no words for what Archer did, and then there was Plunkett. That was a pretty, pretty good setup, and it clicked.

Currently they have Salt and Duckett to open, what can only be described as a blank letter, the wild card option in crossword at 3, and Root, Brook, Buttler, and Livingstone to follow them. I like all these batters in an ODI setup. What I do want is for the England management to know what to do with these guys. For a while there was Bethell in there, and I think he’s the guy they view as the serious contender to fill the gap here. They wanted Brydon Carse slotted at no. 8 for the additional batting depth and potentially 8-10 overs an innings. But he’s out injured now so they have Jamie Overton filling in his shoes. In my opinion, a slightly better batter, one whom I’d back a lot more than Carse when the team’s stuck at 7 wickets after 40 overs to get to a respectable end, but I won’t want him bowling 10 overs, almost ever.

Now they’re facing injuries and they’re going through structural reforms; every team is or has in the near future. What I expect, strictly from the batting unit and how the team management views it, is a clear sense of direction for the way they should structure your innings. I find Salt to be a promising talent. He’s got a lot of shots under the belt and that over vs Rana in the 2nd ODI should tell you how quick he is to think on his feet. But he isn’t batting like it’s a 50-over game. Not that he’s striking as high as he generally does in T20s, but soon as he gets on the crease, he bats like he’s able to visualize the end of the innings already.

What I feel the batters, and the management, should do right now, is back them, and revamp the way they view the game. The theory of bazball-ing (yuck) your way through an ODI innings has not worked, you’ve seen it, and the problem starts at the top. Both Salt and Duckett are good ODI batters, but maybe they need controlled aggression. The world had seen little of Root in ODIs for years, but it took him no time to come to his own, in a format in which he’s scored almost 7,000 runs. Root’s an amazing no. 3 and adept (or at least above average) across bowling styles and line-length combinations. But you don’t want your no. 3 to come out to bat before the first 10 overs. It’s a domino effect and can disbalance the way every batter thereon out bats.

So, England, I reckon you should take a beat. Look back at your vulnerabilities (because there are some very specific batter-specific ones), and then maybe host a watch-party of the 2019 World Cup. I’m going to go stretch for a bit before I begin with the sequel.